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Introduction
On July 26, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).1 The ADA was intend-
ed to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities2 by 
expanding the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act) to cover people with dis-
abilities in need of coverage from a non-federal employer or entity.3 
Unfortunately, due to a number of Supreme Court cases narrowing the 
focus of the ADA,4 the individuals that were intended by Congress to 
have full protection under the law were no longer assured adequate 
coverage.5 In 2008, in response to the narrowing of the definition of 
disability and the serious restrictions on the term “substantially limits” 
that resulted from Supreme Court decisions that led to poor employ-
ee success rates, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
*J.D. Candidate 2012, American University Washington College of Law; B.A. Tulane University, 
2005. I would like to thank my friends and family for their support while writing this paper. I 
would also like to thank Professor Robert Dinerstein for his assistance and guidance throughout 
the writing process. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Legislation & 
Policy Brief for their work in editing and preparing this piece for publication
1  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
2  Id. at § 2.
3  Stephanie Proctor Miller, Comment, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment 
Discrimination on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 701, 704 (1997).
4  See Toyota Motor Mnfr. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that for a major life activity 
to be considered substantially limiting under the ADA it has to severely restrict the individual’s 
ability to do a task of central importance to an average person’s daily life); see also Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (determining that whether or not an individual is disabled 
under the ADA needs to be determined with the consideration of mitigating measures).
5  See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
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(ADAAA).6 Congress passed this legislation to “restore the intent and 
protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”7 President 
George W. Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25, 2008.8 
The ADAAA went into effect on January 1, 2009.9 
This paper will argue that although there have been no decisions 
thus far applying the ADAAA to cases of discrimination against in-
dividuals suffering from mental illness, the amendments enacted in 
2008 should result in greater coverage for such individuals. Part I of 
this paper will examine the history leading up to the passage of the 
ADAAA, including the failures of the ADA and the decisions by the 
Supreme Court that severely limited the scope of the ADA.10 Part II 
will examine the ADAAA and analyze the impact it should have on 
cases brought by individuals discriminated against on the basis of their 
mental illnesses.11 This discussion will include examining the language 
of the statute as well as regulations and guidances that should be used 
to assist courts in protecting the rights of individuals who fall within 
the scope of the ADAAA because of their mental illnesses. Finally, the 
paper will conclude that under the ADAAA, individuals with mental 
illnesses should not continue to have the difficulties in prevailing in 
discrimination suits that they did under the ADA.12 
I. Background
The ADAAA was passed by Congress and signed into law by Presi-
dent George W. Bush on September 25, 2008.13 Congress passed the 
ADAAA after decisions by the Supreme Court severely eroded the 
legislative intent of the original disability protection legislation, the 
ADA.14 
The primary purpose of the ADA was “to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”15 Between the ADA (private enti-
ties) and the Rehab Act (public entities), theoretically, all individuals 
with disabilities would now be protected from harmful discrimination 
6  Id.
7  Id.
8  Id.
9  Id.
10  See infra pp. 8-16.
11  See infra pp. 16-31.
12  See infra pp. 31-32. 
13  Id.
14  Id.; see Toyota Motor Mnfr. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that for a major life activ-
ity to be considered substantially limiting under the ADA it has to severely restrict the individu-
al’s ability to do a task of central importance to an average person’s daily life); Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (determining that whether or not an individual is disabled under 
the ADA needs to be determined with the consideration of mitigating measures).
15  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327, amended 
by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
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on the basis of a disability. The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a phys-
ical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”16 In terms 
of mental illnesses, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) Regulations further elaborate that a mental illness is consid-
ered “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific 
learning disabilities.”17 
Despite the ultimate addition of mental illness and psychological 
disorders in the final version of the ADA, there were a few members 
of Congress who believed that such disorders should not be included 
in the legislation.18 Fortunately, those members were unsuccessful in 
their attempts. There were, however, a number of disorders that are 
classified as mental or psychological disorders that were specifically 
denied coverage under the ADA.19 These disorders include “transvesti-
tism, transexualism, pedophilia, . . . gender identity disorders, . . . com-
pulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania.” 20 Additionally, the law 
excludes disorders stemming from the use of illegal drugs.21
In addition to having the qualifying disability, the individual must 
show that his or her disability “substantially limits” a major life activi-
ty.22 Although the ADA itself did not define “substantially limits,” the 
EEOC Regulations defined “substantially limits” as 
(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the aver-
age person in the general population can perform; or (ii) 
[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which an individual can perform a par-
ticular major life activity as compared to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in 
the general population can perform that same major life 
activity.23 
With the combination of the statutory definition and the EEOC 
Regulations, individuals with mental illnesses, who were discriminat-
ed against on the basis of these illnesses, should have been covered by 
16  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2009).
17  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2011).
18  See 135 Cong. Rec. S10765-803 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (debate between Sens. Helms and 
Harkin).
19  Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimination, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 79, 102-03 (2006) (discussing the pre- 
and post-enactment debate on including personality disorders in the ADA’s scope).
20  42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2000).
21  42 U.S.C. § 12210(a).
22  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
23  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2009).
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the ADA because mental illness will often have an impact on major life 
activities of individuals and is specifically mentioned in the definition 
of disability.24
Unfortunately, that is not what happened. In 1999, the Supreme 
Court decided Sutton v. United Air Lines,25 a case involving identical 
twins with severe myopia who applied for jobs with United Air Lines 
as global airline pilots.26 The twins were denied the jobs, despite having 
the requisite experience, because their uncorrected vision was worse 
than 20/200, even though their corrected vision was normal,27 and 
United Air Lines had a requirement that all pilots have uncorrected vi-
sion no worse than 20/100.28 Therefore, according to United Air Lines, 
the twins were not qualified for the jobs for which they were apply-
ing.29 The issue before the Court was whether an individual’s disability 
should be evaluated with reference to his or her mitigated or unmiti-
gated state.30 The Court ultimately decided that an individual claiming 
protection because of a disability needs to be considered in his or her 
mitigated state, taking into consideration any factors that may make 
the individual seem and act normal, despite his or her disability.31 
The Supreme Court had a number of justifications for this decision. 
First, the Court stated that within the statute, the phrase “substantially 
limits” is in the “present indicative verb form,” which indicates to the 
Court that courts need to examine the person as he or she is, not as 
the person hypothetically would or could be without the mitigating 
measure.32 The Supreme Court’s second justification for its decision 
was that the ADA requires an individualized inquiry as to whether a 
person should be considered disabled under the statute.33 The Court 
reasoned that it would become impossible to truly have individualized 
inquiries if Congress intended individuals to be judged in their un-
mitigated states because of the time that would be required to actually 
carry out such an inquiry for every person.34 The Court made this de-
termination because viewing a plaintiff in his or her unmitigated and 
therefore hypothetical state would require viewing all plaintiffs with 
similar illnesses or disabilities as a group instead of individually.35 The 
determination would then have to be made based upon what the ill-
24  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2009).
25  527 U.S. 471 (1999).
26  Id. at 475.
27  Id. at 476.
28  Id.
29  Id.
30  Id. at 481.
31  Id. at 482 (“[M]itigating mesures must be taken into account when judging whether that per-
son is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act.”). 
32  Id. at 482.
33  Id. at 483.
34  Id.
35  Id.
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ness or disability could cause for the individual instead of what it is 
actually causing for the individual.36 The final justification for the Su-
preme Court’s decision centers on Congress’s finding, in the ADA, that 
43 million Americans have some type of mental or physical disability.37 
The Court reasoned that if Congress intended for people to be consid-
ered in their unmitigated states, especially given the number of people 
who wear some type of corrective lenses, the number provided by Con-
gress would have to be higher than 160 million.38 For these reasons, the 
Supreme Court announced its decision to require courts to determine 
a plaintiff’s disability status on the basis of how the individual is in his 
or her mitigated state.
In his dissent in Sutton, Justice Stevens discussed what he believed 
was Congress’s actual intent in the ADA.39 According to Justice Ste-
vens, Congress clearly intended people who chose to mitigate their 
disabilities to be covered under the law.40 Giving the example of war 
veterans who use prosthetics,41 he believed there was no way Congress 
intended this group of individuals to be denied coverage under the 
Act, but whom, using the Sutton standard, would not be covered be-
cause of mitigating measures.42 Justice Stevens points out that just be-
cause people are taking advantage of a mitigating measure does not 
mean that they are cured of their illnesses or disorders, or that they 
will never be discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities.43 
The dissent also points out that it makes no sense to allow someone 
who has a record of a past disability to be covered, but not someone 
with a current disability that is being mitigated.44 In fact, the Senate 
and House reports regarding the original passage of the ADA made 
clear that mitigating measures were not to be considered, with the Sen-
ate stating that “whether a person has a disability should be assessed 
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as rea-
sonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.”45 
The Court affirmed its decision in Sutton with its decisions in Mur-
phy v. United Postal Service Inc.46 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.47 In 
Murphy, the Supreme Court decided that an individual with high blood 
pressure should not be considered disabled under the ADA because 
36  Id. at 483-84.
37  Id. at 484; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990).
38  See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 472.
39  Id. at 495-98.
40  Id. at 495.
41  Id. at 497-98.
42  Id.
43  Id.
44  Id. at 499.
45  Id. at 499-500 (analyzing S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 23 (1989) and H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. III, p. 
28 (1990)).
46  527 U.S. 516 (1999).
47  527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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his condition was mitigated with medications, allowing him to func-
tion normally.48 Additionally, in Kirkingburg, the Court examined the 
case of a truck driver with amblyopia, a form of monocular vision.49 In 
that case, the individual was fired for failing to meet the Department of 
Transportation’s (DOT) vision standards despite having no difficulty 
performing the duties of the job.50 Notwithstanding his clear disabil-
ity, Kirkingburg’s “brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for 
coping with his visual impairment and thus his body compensates for 
his disability.”51 The Court determined that the subconscious correc-
tions that his mind had been making for years were indeed a mitigat-
ing measure, and he should be considered in his mitigated, and there-
fore compensated state, even though the mitigation was unconscious.52 
Therefore, with what is commonly considered the “Sutton Trilogy,” 
these three cases, all decided by the Supreme Court on the same day, 
combined to create a regime whereby an individual who mitigated his or 
her disability, whether consciously or unconsciously, generally became 
less likely to qualify as an individual with a disability under the ADA.
The Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of the ADA with 
its decision in 2002 of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams.53 In Toyota, an employee with carpal tunnel syndrome sued 
Toyota for failure to accommodate her disability.54 The Court held that 
Williams was not sufficiently disabled because she failed to meet the 
“substantially limited” standard of the definition.55 With this decision, 
the Court dictated that the term “substantially limits” should mean 
that to be considered disabled under the ADA, the “individual must 
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual 
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s 
daily lives.”56
The EEOC provided regulations as to what should be considered 
substantially limiting.57 Under the EEOC Regulations, in addition to 
determining that the ability to perform or take part in a major life activity 
had to be significantly restricted,58 the EEOC also provided other factors 
48  See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 525 (finding that because Murphy could not show that he could not 
perform a class of jobs, he could not be disabled as a matter of law). 
49  Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 559.
50  See id. at 560 (explaining a DOT waiver program where individuals with deficient vision 
could receive DOT certification after three years of commercial driving experience without hav-
ing an accident or getting their licenses suspended).
51  See id. at 565 (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc., 143 F.3d, 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
52  See id. at 565-66 (noting that one’s body’s adjustment to a disability is no different than using 
an artificial aid). 
53  See 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
54  Id. at 184.
55  Id. at 184-85.
56  Id. at 185.
57  29 C.F.R 1630.2(j)(2)(iii) (1991).
58  Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
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for making the substantially limited determination.59 The factors provid-
ed by the EEOC suggest that courts examine “(i) [t]he nature and sever-
ity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the im-
pairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected 
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.”60
In light of the Supreme Court narrowing the scope of the ADA, 
which was intended to eliminate discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities, Congress felt it necessary to respond because the in-
tent of its groundbreaking legislation from 1990 was apparently being 
misunderstood. In response, Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD) and 
Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) introduced versions of the ADAAA in their 
respective Houses of Congress.61 
In the findings of the ADAAA, Congress plainly states that the Su-
preme Court’s decisions regarding the ADA in recent years have nar-
rowed the scope of the law such that individuals Congress clearly in-
tended to be fully covered were no longer afforded adequate coverage 
under the law.62 With the new legislation, Congress attempted to right 
the wrongs of the Supreme Court and ensure that all Americans with 
disabilities receive adequate coverage under federal law.
The ADAAA has a number of significant changes that will help all 
Americans with disabilities have more consistent coverage under the 
law. These changes will especially help increase coverage for individu-
als with mental illnesses. One of the most significant changes under 
the ADAAA is the rejection of the mitigating measures standard set 
forth in Sutton.63 The new law requires that any determination about 
whether a person should be considered disabled under the law gener-
ally should be made without regard to mitigating measures.64 Mitigat-
ing measures are especially relevant for individuals with mental ill-
nesses. According to the National Institute of Mental Health, in 2008, 
58.7 percent of adults with mental illnesses received some type of treat-
ment, either medication, therapy, or both.65 This number increases to 
71 percent among adults diagnosed with some form of depression, and 
is even higher among women with mental illnesses.66 These statistics 
show that a huge percentage of individuals with mental illnesses are 
59  Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
60  Id.
61  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (introduced by Senator 
Tom Harkin); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2008) (introduced by 
Representative Steny Hoyer). 
62  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
63  See id. at § 2(b)(2).
64  Id. at § 343(4)(E)(i).
65  Use of Mental Health Services and Treatment Among Adults, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health (Oct. 
26, 2009, 3:02 PM), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/3USE_MT_ADULT.shtml (indicating that 
outpatient services and prescription medication are the most frequently used treatments).
66  See id. (“Generally, women and adults over 50 were more likely than men and younger adults 
to use services for depression.”).
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taking measures to mitigate their diseases. After Sutton, an enormous 
number of people with legitimate disabilities, especially those with 
mental health disorders, were no longer covered under the ADA sole-
ly because of the measures they were taking to control their illnesses. 
Therefore, the elimination of the mitigating measures rule is incredibly 
important for individuals with mental illnesses.
In addition, cases brought under the ADA generally required an 
extensive determination as to whether the individual was actually 
disabled instead of the determination focusing on whether the person 
was discriminated against on the basis of the claimed disability.67 The 
ADAAA directs the lower courts to end the extensive determination 
process previously required to determine whether the person is dis-
abled.68 The courts are instead instructed to focus on what the ADAAA 
is actually intended to do: prevent discrimination against people with 
disabilities.69
There are other significant changes in the ADAAA. While the 
ADAAA keeps the same definition of disability that existed under the 
ADA,70 the new law does something that the ADA did not do. It pro-
vides examples of what would qualify as a major life activity.71 In addi-
tion to other things, the list includes activities such as “caring for one-
self, . . . learning, . . . concentrating, thinking, [and] communicating.”72 
These are all activities that could have a positive impact on the abil-
ity of people with mental illnesses to more successfully bring claims 
under the ADAAA given that they are activities that are often signifi-
cantly limited by mental illnesses.73 In addition to the list provided by 
Congress in the statute, the EEOC Regulations include an even more 
comprehensive, although not exhaustive, list of what might be con-
sidered major life activities.74 Besides including the activities listed by 
Congress, this list also includes the major life activity of “interacting 
67  See Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There is Nothing Left for Proof: 
The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental Illness, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 
721, 745-51 (2004) (providing a survey of ADA cases in several circuits where the focus was on 
the plaintiff’s disability rather than the discrimination).
68  See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (clarifying that courts should not exten-
sively analyze individuals’ impairments to decide if they are disabilities).
69  See id. (instructing lower courts to focus on whether the challenged entity has complied with 
the ADA, rather than the individuals’ capabilities).
70  Compare id. § 3(1), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (using identical language to define “disability”).
71  See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(2), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
72  Id.
73  But see Paul R. Klein, Note, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Pendulum Swings Back, 60 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 467, 470 (2010) (arguing that the inclusion of these terms might create more 
problems because they sweep too broadly and are too difficult to define as they cannot be seen).
74  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (2011) (listing major life activities to include, but not be limited 
to: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, 
standing, siting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working…” ). 
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with others,” 75 something that is of vital importance to most people in 
their everyday lives, but something that many individuals with mental 
illnesses struggle to do on a daily basis.
In addition to providing examples of what constitutes a major life 
activity, the ADAAA also expands the definition of major life activity 
to include not just activities, but also “major bodily functions.”76 Listed 
among the enumerated major bodily functions are neurological and 
brain functions.77 These categories could be of vital importance to the 
likelihood of success in court for individuals with mental illnesses.78
Another change under the ADAAA is that Congress specified that 
if a person has a disability that is not currently active, he or she should 
still be considered disabled if the disability would substantially limit a 
major life activity when active.79 Additionally, although the ADAAA 
does clearly overturn the “severely restricts” language from Toyota,80 it 
does not define what is meant by the term “substantially limits.” The 
EEOC Final Regulations do provide some guidance, but they also do 
not truly define “substantially limits.” During Senate debates on the 
bill, there was some talk about changing the wording to further define 
what was meant by substantially limits.81 The most likely alternative 
was to change “substantially limits” to “materially restricts.”82 This 
language was defeated in the Senate because of concerns that the “ma-
terially restricts” language was ambiguous and would provide no bet-
ter guidance to the courts than what had already been provided.83 The 
EEOC, in its regulations, provides more information about what “sub-
stantially limits” does not mean than what it does mean.84 In an attempt 
to ensure the courts understand that Congress did not intend them to 
follow the EEOC’s former guidance of “significantly restricted” or the 
Toyota language of “severely restricts,” the EEOC Final Regulation pro-
vides that 
[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of 
this section if it ‘substantially limits’ the ability of an in-
75  Id.
76  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(2)(B), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
77  Id.
78  But see Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 62 Okla. 
L. Rev. 667 (2010) (arguing that the expansion of major life activities and the addition of bodily 
functions actually brings the ADAAA out of the realm of what was intended by the ADA 
because it is too expansive, is now allowing side effects to essentially make someone eligible for 
coverage, and confuses the goal of positive outcomes with the disability definition itself).
79  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(4)(D), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
80  Id. § 1630.2(b)(5).
81  Wendy F. Hensel, Rights Resurgence: The Impact of the ADA Amendments Act on Schools and 
Universities, 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 641, 653 (2009).
82  Id.
83  Id.
84  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2011) (elaborating on the intent of “substantial meaning”).
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dividual to perform a major life activity as compared to 
most people in the general population. An impairment 
need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, 
the individual from performing a major life activity in 
order to be considered substantially limiting.85 
Additionally, the EEOC discusses that the threshold for reaching the 
disability definition is lower than it was under the ADA, and therefore 
the definition of “substantially limits” is less crucial to the determi-
nation.86 The EEOC clearly states that “[t]he question of whether an 
individual meets the definition of disability . . . should not demand 
extensive analysis.”87
II. Individuals with Mental Illnesses Should be More 
Successful Under the ADAAA Than They Were Under the ADA
 A. Coverage Under the ADA for Individuals with  
Mental Illness
Under the ADA, individuals with mental illnesses were generally 
unsuccessful in making claims of discrimination against their employ-
ers.88 In 2009, not a single employee who brought suit under the ADA 
for discrimination in the workplace on the basis of his or her mental 
illness was successful in the claim.89 While employees with mental 
illnesses fared better in previous years, there were still an extremely 
small number of successful employees with mental illness claims un-
der the ADA.90 From the inception of the ADA, there were a number of 
concerns that people with mental illnesses would not be afforded full 
protection under the law. The major concerns were that: 
(1) the legislative history, early commentaries, and 
practice manuals relating to the ADA scarcely acknowl-
edged the application of the Act to persons with mental 
disabilities; (2) when commentators have considered 
the Act’s application to persons with mental disabilities, 
the analysis has generally been limited to persons with 
85  Id.
86  Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)-(iv); see also Bonnie M. Wheaton, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Who is 
Disabled?, 23 Dupage Cnty. Bar Ass’n Brief 22 (2010) (explaining that while the threshold to be 
considered disabled is lower under the ADAAA, it is still a determination that needs to be made, 
based on facts, by the courts).
87  29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2011).
88  See Amy L. Allbright, 2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I – Survey Update, 34 
Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 339, 341 (2010) (explaining that employers generally win 
on summary judgment or dismissals).
89  See id. (describing the drop in employee wins from 2008, when more employees prevailed).
90  Id.
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mental retardation, rather than those with mental illness; 
and (3) no matter how strongly such an Act is worded, 
the law’s aims cannot be met unless there is a correspond-
ing change in public attitudes (especially among the legal 
system interpreting and enforcing the Act).91
When the House of Representatives wrote its report on the pro-
posed legislation, it stated that discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities “often results from false presumptions, generalizations, 
misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and 
pernicious mythologies.”92 This belief is often referred to as discrimi-
nation resulting from myths, fears and stereotypes. Since 1997, claims 
to the EEOC based on a violation of the ADA as a result of the 
employee’s mental illness have increased significantly, especially in the 
areas of manic-depressive disorder, depression, and schizophrenia,93 
and many of these claims were likely based on some type of myth, fear 
or stereotype.
Under the ADA, individuals with mental illnesses had a particu-
larly hard time showing that they were both qualified to do the job 
and significantly disabled enough to qualify for protection against 
discrimination under the ADA. It was particularly hard for such in-
dividuals to prove this because the effects of their disabilities often 
resulted in courts determining that they were not actually qualified 
to do to the job in question.94 This is because some of the most com-
mon outward manifestations of mental illnesses in the work place are 
attendance problems, often resulting from side effects of the individ-
ual’s medications, and problems with concentration and misconduct, 
which often result from an inability to fully deal with the stresses of 
the workplace.95 When individuals are having problems such as these 
at work, especially in terms of missing a lot of days or being habitually 
tardy, courts often determine that they are no longer qualified to do the 
job, and therefore further inquiry into the case is unnecessary.96
91  Jennifer M. Jackson, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Mental Illness, and 
Medication: A Historical Perspective and Hope for the Future, 12 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 219, 224 
(2010).
92  H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 24, at 30 (1990).
93  See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ADA Charge Data by Impairments/
Bases - Receipts. 
FY 1997-FY 2010, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-receipts.cfm 
(showing that the rates for impairment for persons with manic depressive disorder rose from 
1.9% in 1997 to 4.3% in 2008).
94  See Randal I. Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace after Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
86 Cornell L. Rev. 927, 945 (2001) (describing the requirement to prove disabled status and 
qualification for the position as a catch-22).
95  Id.
96  See Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F. 3d. 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that an employee with depression who missed a significant amount of work was not quali-
fied for the job because she would have to be present in the workplace to perform the essential 
18 The Americans with Disabilties Act
Another significant problem facing individuals with mental illness-
es is that their employers often do not know they are disabled, as men-
tal illnesses are generally not known to others unless the individual 
reveals his or her condition.97 Under the ADA, an employer is only held 
accountable for discrimination on the basis of disability if the employer 
is aware that the disability exists.98 There are a multitude of cases, span-
ning from the inception of the ADA through the present, where the 
plaintiff was denied relief for the alleged discrimination because the 
employer was unaware of the condition.99
One part of the reason why individuals with mental illnesses might 
have had trouble claiming disability status under the ADA stems from 
the EEOC Guidance and Regulations in regards to the mental illness-
es.100 The EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities states that “traits or behaviors 
are not, in themselves, mental impairments.”101 While the EEOC seems 
to be making the point that it requires more than just the traits or be-
haviors of an illness to be actually considered disabled, the traits or be-
haviors that characterize the illness are often what the person is being 
discriminated against for. The EEOC makes a valid point, that odd be-
haviors alone are not enough for coverage. However, it may have given 
some employers the idea that discriminating against an employee on 
the basis of his or her traits or behaviors, especially if the employer 
is not certain that the employee has a mental illness, is an acceptable 
practice. In turn, it is possible that courts may get the impression, based 
on the EEOC Guidance, that it is allowable for an employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee with a mental illness because the fact that the 
employee is exhibiting unusual behaviors or has unusual traits is not 
a disability.
However, the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities was not entirely negative 
for individuals with mental illnesses. The EEOC created the guidance 
functions of her job); see also Grubb v. Southwest Air Lines, 296 F. App’x 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1986 (2009). 
97  See generally Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 1328 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (determining 
that without the employee telling the employer about a mental illness, there was no way for the 
employer to know).
98  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
99  See Kobus v. College of St. Scholastica, Inc., 2009 WL 294370, at *7 (D. Minn. 2009); see also 
Fussell v. Georgia Ports Authority, 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
100  See Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimination, and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 79, 103 (2006) (describing how the 
EEOC guidance specifically notes that traits or behaviors are not, in themselves, mental impair-
ments although they may be linked).
101  See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on 
the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (1997), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
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because it was receiving a high number of mental health claims.102 It 
wanted to clarify how the law works and improve protection for those 
individuals.103 The guidance helped to highlight, for both employers 
and employees, the parts of the ADA and related regulations relevant 
to individuals with mental illnesses. The guidance explains that miti-
gating measures should not be considered,104 chronic and episodic 
disorders are covered,105 and major life activities includes interacting 
with others and concentrating.106 The guidance also provides direction 
about disclosing mental illnesses107 and how to request accommoda-
tions.108 Despite some flaws, this guidance overall is an invaluable tool 
for individuals with mental illnesses and their employers.
Individuals with mental illnesses had a major problem with the 
EEOC Guidance and Regulations because of the lack of official inclu-
sion of mental illness related major life activities, such as concentrating 
and interacting with others. In fact, there were instances where indi-
viduals with mental illnesses attempted to bring suit under the ADA 
claiming that they were disabled because they were substantially lim-
ited in these major life activities. These claims, however, were rejected 
by the courts because they were not viewed as rising to the level of a 
major life activity that was substantially limited.109 In the case of Soileau 
v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., the First Circuit felt that if the EEOC intended 
interacting with others to be considered a major life activity, then it 
would have included it in its Regulations or Guidance.110 In addition, 
the Court felt that no workable definition of interacting with others 
could exist because it was too different from things like walking and 
breathing, which were specifically mentioned by the EEOC.111 In Pack 
v. Kmart Corp., the Tenth Circuit determined that “[c]oncentration may 
be a significant and necessary component of a major life activity, such 
as working, learning, or speaking, but it is not an ‘activity’ itself,” and 
therefore it cannot qualify as a major life activity that is substantially 
102  See id. (explaining that the EEOC “receives a large number of charges under the ADA alleg-
ing employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability”). 
103  See id. (“This guidance is designed to: facilitate the full enforcement of the ADA with respect 
to individuals alleging employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability; respond 
to questions and concerns expressed by individuals with psychiatric disabilities regarding the 
ADA; and answer questions posed by employers about how principles of ADA analysis apply in 
the context of psychiatric disabilities.”).
104  Id. at no. 6. This guidance was written pre-Sutton. 
105  Id. at no. 8.
106  Id. at no. 9-10.
107  Id. at no. 14 (explaining the circumstances when an employer can ask for disability-related 
information).
108  Id. at no. 17-29.
109  See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, 
Inc., 105 F. 3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).
110  105 F.3d at 15 (stating that interacting with others is not listed as an ability in the EEOC 
regulations).
111  Id.
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limited in terms of qualifying an individual for protection under the 
ADA.112 However, some plaintiffs have successfully made claims that 
interacting with others is a major life activity. In McAlindin v. County of 
San Diego, the Ninth Circuit held that anindividual with anxiety, panic 
and somatoform disorders was disabled under the ADA, in part be-
cause he was substantially limited in the major life activity of interact-
ing with others.113 The court determined that interacting with others 
qualified as a major life activity because it “is an essential, regular func-
tion, like walking and breathing, [so it] easily falls within the definition 
of ‘major life activity.’”114
A significant problem after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton 
was the effect that using medication would have on the likelihood of a 
person succeeding in an ADA claim based on a medicated psychiatric 
disorder.115 In Sutton, the Supreme Court declared that should an indi-
vidual use any means to mitigate his or her illness, his or her claim of 
being disabled needs to be determined in that mitigated state.116 In the 
case of Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, the Eighth Circuit determined that 
a police officer with depression was not disabled because his medica-
tion allowed him to function normally, even though without mitigat-
ing measures he attempted suicide.117 It did not appear that the Sutton 
Court was encouraging plaintiffs who generally mitigated their con-
ditions to stop correcting those conditions just to have the ability to 
sue under the ADA.118 There was, however, a fear after the Sutton deci-
sion that people who were dutiful in strictly mitigating their illnesses 
would be less likely to succeed than someone with the same disorder of 
similar severity who was less strict about his or her mitigation.119 There 
was also a fear that individuals who had the money or insurance for 
adequate mitigation measures would be disadvantaged under the stat-
ute as compared with individuals who did not have the means to miti-
gate, and therefore could only be viewed in their unmitigated states.120
Especially after the decision in Sutton, individuals with disabilities 
that could be mitigated, especially those with mental illnesses, began 
offering an alternative theory to their disability claims, that their medi-
112  166 F.3d at 1305.
113  McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999).
114  Id. at 1234.
115  See Jackson, supra note 91, at 220 (2010) (commenting on the division between the lower 
courts after the Sutton decision on how to address the issue of mitigating measures, such as 
medications used to ameliorate the illness). 
116  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999).
117  See Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1999). 
118  See Jackson, supra note 92, at 231-32 (explaining that the Court in Sutton did not want to 
encourage future plaintiffs from not mitigating their disabilities in order to meet the statutory 
definition of disability). 
119  Goldstein, supra note 94, at 953 (2001).
120  Id.
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cations were the cause of their disabilities.121 For example, in Collins 
v. Prudential Investment & Retirement Services, the plaintiff claimed her 
medication for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) was 
causing a sleep disorder, causing her to need additional medication.122 
The court determined that the mitigating measure of taking medica-
tions corrected the impairment, so she was not disabled under the 
law.123 In the Sutton decision, the Supreme Court pointed out a few 
mitigating measures that have negative side effects for the individuals 
using them.124 The mitigating measures listed by the Supreme Court 
were antipsychotic drugs, drugs used to treat Parkinson’s disease, and 
antiepileptic drugs.125 Additionally, the Court noted that given its inter-
pretation of the ADA leading to the decision on mitigating measures, 
for courts to determine whether a person qualified as “substantially 
limited” as part of the disability definition, side effects of the mitigating 
measures, whether good or bad, would have to be considered.126 
Plaintiffs did bring claims prior to Sutton that they were disabled 
due to the side effects of their medications, but the number of those 
claims increased after the Supreme Court’s decision.127 Some Circuit 
Courts established a test beyond the normal ADA disability claim to 
determine whether side effects of a medication could be considered 
disabling under the law.128 This test requires the plaintiff to show that 
“(1) the treatment is required in the prudent judgment of the medical 
profession, (2) the treatment is not just an attractive option, and (3) that 
the treatment is not required solely in anticipation of an impairment 
resulting from the plaintiff’s voluntary choices.”129 Once a plaintiff 
prevails on the above test, courts generally treat the side effects of the 
medication the same as they would any other disability.130 If the side 
effects of medication taken to ameliorate the effects of a disability are 
themselves disabling, courts have determined that a plaintiff can pre-
121  See id at 953-54.
122  See Collins v. Prudential Inv. & Ret. Serv., 119 F. App’x 371, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing 
the Plaintiff’s need to take Ambien to counteract the effects of Adderol).
123  See id. (stating that the test of mitigating measures is not whether the mitigating measure 
cures the disability).
124  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (noting medications that cause 
severe side effects).
125  See id. (citing reports of side effects of various drugs). 
126  See id. at 482 (rejecting the interpretation that people must be evaluated in their uncorrected 
state). 
127  Cf. Jackson, supra note 91, at 232-33 (2010) (explaining that courts considered the disabling 
effects of medications before Sutton in determining coverage under the ADA).
128  See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Christian v. 
St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1052 (7th Cir. 1997).
129  See Sulima, 602 F.3d at 186.
130  Christian v. St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1052; see Lauren J. McGarity, 
Note, Disabling Corrections and Correctable Disabilities: Why Side Effects Might be the Saving Grace of 
Sutton, 109 Yale L.J. 1161, 1182 (2000).
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vail on his or her disability claim.131
However, not mitigating an illness or condition that could be miti-
gated could, on its own, disqualify a plaintiff from coverage under the 
ADA. Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights132 is the first case where a 
non-mitigating plaintiff was found to have no claim because of a failure 
to mitigate.133 In this case, the plaintiff was fired from his job as a police 
officer after having a hypoglycemic reaction as a result of uncontrolled 
diabetes.134 He was ultimately fired due to the effect on his body caused 
by not medicating his diabetes.135 The court determined that his failure 
to medicate his condition made him unqualified to continue to work 
as a police officer.136 Other courts have interpreted the Siefken decision 
to stand for the proposition “that a plaintiff cannot recover under the 
ADA if through plaintiff’s own fault plaintiff fails to control an other-
wise controllable illness.”137 
After Sutton, the calculus changed for individuals with disabilities 
in terms of mitigation of their illnesses or disabilities. Theoretically, af-
ter the Supreme Court’s decisions in 1999, a person was to be viewed in 
his or her current state, irrespective of whether that state was mitigated 
or unmitigated.138 The Supreme Court, in its justification for requiring 
plaintiffs to be viewed in their mitigated states, proclaimed that to do 
otherwise would require speculation about what an individual would 
hypothetically be like in another state.139 The Court believed that if the 
rule were to look at a plaintiff in a hypothetical state, Congress’s desire 
for an individualized inquiry for each plaintiff would not be met since 
the individual claiming a disability would theoretically have to be 
looked at the same as any other individual with that disability.140 The 
same justification, however, also works to ensure that individuals who 
choose not to mitigate their disabilities would need to be examined in 
their current, and therefore unmitigated, states. If the courts were to 
view individuals with unmitigated disabilities in any light other than 
the way they currently are, they would be going against the Court’s 
holding in Sutton. 
In his dissent in Sutton, Justice Stevens makes the point that it is not 
131  See Jamison v. Dow Chem. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 715, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing Sutton, 527 
U.S. at 484).
132  65 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1995). 
133  See id. at 667 (finding that the employer did not have to create reasonable accommodations if 
the employee could not control his disability). See also Jackson, supra note 92 at 234-35 (discuss-
ing the circumstances of Siefken).
134  Siefken, 65 F.3d at 665-66.
135  Id. at 666.
136  Id. at 667.
137  See Paine ex rel. Eilman v. Johnson, 2010 WL 785397, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010) (citing 
Nunn v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 448 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (C.D. Ill. 2006)).
138  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 472 (1999).
139  Id.
140  Id.
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the consideration of mitigating measures that results in people with 
similar disabilities being grouped together unnecessarily, it is instead 
the majority’s decision in Sutton that does that.141 Justice Stevens rea-
sons that by not allowing mitigating measures to be considered, the 
Court is actually condoning employers having blanket policies stating 
that individuals with certain disabilities are incapable of doing the job, 
when in fact, with reasonable accommodations, there are most likely 
some disabled individuals who would be able to perform the essential 
functions and adequately do the job.142
Unfortunately, even after Sutton, courts continued to deny coverage 
to individuals that chose to not mitigate their disabilities, even though 
this was contrary to the holding from Sutton.143 In the case of Nunn v. 
Illinois State Board of Education, the plaintiff, an employee suffering from 
bipolar disorder, was denied coverage under the ADA.144 This denial, 
theoretically, was because she did not mitigate her disease given that 
she did not or could not acknowledge that she actually had bipolar dis-
order.145 Coverage under the ADA was denied in large part because, in 
her unmitigated state, the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified for her 
job.146 However, the plaintiff was also denied coverage because she did 
not mitigate her condition.147 The court cited the decision from Siefken, 
that a plaintiff who chooses not to mitigate a condition that can be miti-
gated cannot be covered under the ADA.148 Because the court believed 
that bipolar disorder could be mitigated, the plaintiff was barred from 
further consideration under the ADA.149 Although the Nunn decision 
was seven years after Sutton, there is no mention of either the Sutton de-
cision or the rule implied in that case, that individuals cannot be denied 
coverage under the ADA simply because they choose not to mitigate 
their conditions; they need to be viewed in their current states.150 Al-
though the plaintiff in Nunn still likely would have been denied cover-
age since she, in her unmitigated state, was not qualified for her job, the 
case ignores Sutton but adheres to Siefken.
141  Id. at 509-510.
142  Id.
143  Jackson, supra note 91, at 237-38 (2010) (detailing cases that applied Sutton and Siefken to 
deny ADA coverage to nonmitigating plaintiffs).
144  448 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
145  Id.
146  Id.
147  Id. at 1001-02.
148  Id. (citing Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir.1995)).
149  Id.
150  Id.; see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 472 (1999).
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B. Coverage for Individuals with Mental Illness 
Post-ADAAA Passage
When the ADAAA was passed in 2008, members of the disability 
communities had high hopes that it would help individuals with dis-
abilities, especially those with mental illnesses, diabetes, and epilepsy, 
disorders which, under the old regime, were often excluded from cov-
erage.151 Additionally, plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs were excited at 
the possibility of having their litigation move forward, instead of be-
ing decided at the summary judgment stage for the employer, as so 
many cases were under the ADA.152 In 2009, there were no employees 
with mental illnesses who were successful in their ADA claims against 
an employer.153 When looking at ADA claims cumulatively, for all dis-
abilities, plaintiffs were only successful 2.6 percent of the time in 2009, 
accounting for just nine out of 454 cases.154 Many of these cases were 
decided for the employer at the summary judgment stage because al-
though the employee claimed to have some type of disability, due to 
the narrowing of the definition of disability by the Supreme Court in 
the “Sutton Trilogy” and Toyota, the individual had trouble establishing 
either that he or she was otherwise qualified for the job or that his or 
her disability substantially limited a major life activity.155
However, the high hopes for the future in disability discrimination 
claims have not yet come to light. This is not to say that the ADAAA 
will not sufficiently do what it intended—broaden the coverage of the 
legislation to fully cover all qualified individuals.156 Many people are 
predicting that all plaintiffs may not be successful, but there will be 
more disability discrimination claims under the new law, and over-
all more plaintiffs will be successful in their cases.157 There are many 
plaintiffs who had pending cases at the time of the ADAAA’s passage, 
or who have brought claims subsequent to the passage. The ADAAA 
151  See Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A Proposal to 
Restore Civil Rights Protections for all Workers, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 321, 321-22 (2003) (noting 
that people suffering from epilepsy, diabetes, and psychiatric conditions who are able to control 
their conditions with medication routinely had their ADA cases dismissed as outside of the 
protection of the statute).
152  See generally Allbright, supra note 88.
153  See id. at 341 (recounting survey results that indicating that no employee won in cases of 
mental illness or substance abuse). 
154  Id. at 339 (the least employee wins in the survey’s history).
155  Danielle J. Ravencraft, Note, Why the “New ADA” Requires an Individualized Inquiry as to What 
Qualifies as a “Major Life Activity, 37 N. Ky. L. Rev. 441, 442-45 (2010).
156  See Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2, 3, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (listing the findings and purpose of the 
ADA Amendments of 2008).
157  See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1483, 1495-1500 (2011). See also Wendy F. Hensel, Rights Resurgence: The 
Impact of the ADA Amendments Act on Schools and Universities, 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 641, 667-68 
(2009) (discussing the likelihood of increased litigation due to the ADAAA and the potential for 
better outcomes for plaintiffs).
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became effective on January 1, 2009.158 However, there is no published 
case law to date dealing with mental illness in which the plaintiff’s 
cause of action and damages sought originate after the effective date 
of the bill.159 In all of the cases where a plaintiff with a mental illness 
is seeking damages for a past action of his or her employer, the courts 
have determined that the amendments do not apply retroactively, and 
therefore the courts are bound by the ADA and case law surrounding 
that statute, not the ADAAA.160 The courts that have already faced this 
issue determined that “Congress did not state in the ADAAA or indi-
cate in the legislative history whether the amendments should govern 
cases arising before January 1, 2009.”161 One such court determined that 
a plaintiff cannot be judged under the standards of the ADAAA be-
cause the new legislation created new legal standards and broadened 
the scope of the law.162
Courts have stated that, dating back to cases surrounding the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, when amendments to legislation create a substantial 
change to the structure of the statute, the new legislation cannot apply 
to cases currently pending.163 The Court says, “a statute does not operate 
retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case arising from con-
duct antedating the statute’s enactment or upsets expectations based in 
prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches 
new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”164
There has been one case that has applied the ADAAA to pending 
legislation.165 In Jenkins v. National Board of Medical Examiners, the plain-
tiff was a medical student seeking extra time on the United States Med-
ical Licensing Examination (USMLE) based on his diagnosed reading 
disorder.166 Jenkins was awarded extra time for other standardized 
tests, such as the ACT and MCAT, but was denied the extra time for 
the USMLE.167 The District Court for the Western District of Kentucky 
denied Jenkins any relief based on its belief that, under the Toyota 
standard, he failed to identify major life activities in which he was sub-
158  See Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (listing the effective date of the ADAAA as 
January 1, 2009).
159  See, e.g., Durham v. McDonald’s Rests. of Okla., 325 F. App’x 694 (10th Cir. 2009) (footnote 2); 
Pinegar v. Shinseki, 2010 WL 891700, at *1 (M.D. Penn. Mar. 10, 2010); Geiger v. Pfizer, Inc., 2009 
WL 983545, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2009); Schmitz v. Louisiana, 2009 WL 210497, at *2 (M.D. La. 
Jan. 27, 2009) (the ADA Amendments do not apply retroactively).
160  See, e.g., Durham, 325 F. App’x at 695; Pinegar, 2010 WL 891700, at *1; Geiger, 2009 WL 983545, 
at *2; Schmitz, 2009 WL 210497, at *1-2 (ADA Amendments are not retroactive).
161  Schmitz, 2009 WL 210497, at *2.
162  Id. at *2-3.
163  See Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 2009 WL 331638, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009).
164  Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994)).
165  Id. 
166  See id. at *1 (giving the factual background of the case).
167  See id. (noting that Jenkin’s request for additional time was denied by the National Board of 
Medical Examiners after several levels of review).
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stantially limited.168 Jenkins claimed that he was substantially limited 
in the major life activity of reading.169 The District Court had decided 
that, under Toyota, which was good law at the time of its decision, Jen-
kins was not limited enough compared to the general population in 
his ability to read even though it was evident he read slower and with 
more difficulty than most.170
The Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded.171 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “because this case in-
volves prospective relief and was pending when the amendments be-
came effective, the ADA must be applied as amended.”172 The plaintiff 
wanted extra time to take a test, something that would happen after the 
effective date of the ADAAA.173 Additionally, because he was not ask-
ing for past damages, he was not asking the court to hold the National 
Board of Medical Examiners liable for anything that happened before 
the amendments were passed.174 With this decision, the court made it 
clear that although the ADAAA cannot apply retroactively for cases 
seeking damages for incidents of discrimination that occurred before 
the effective date of the legislation, if someone had legislation pending 
when the ADAAA went into effect, and the individual is only seeking 
injunctive relief, the plaintiff’s case should be entitled to consideration 
under the new legislation. If the lower court had based its decision on 
the new law (which did not exist at the time of its decision), it may not 
have come to the same conclusion that it did, given that the ADAAA 
provides a much broader scope as to what qualifies as a disability 
because of a substantial limitation in a major life activity.175 The Sixth 
Circuit did however make clear that it is a remand, and that the plaintiff 
is not guaranteed a victory.176 The court also makes clear that even if the 
lower court, on remand, does find that the plaintiff is disabled under the 
ADAAA, he is not automatically guaranteed the remedy that he is seek-
ing. Instead, the decision will be a determination for the court to make, as 
to what the National Board of Medical Examiners should be required to 
168  See id. (citing Jenkins, 2008 WL 410237, at *2-3 (finding that Jenkins could not demonstrate 
that his reading difficulties prevented him from performing daily tasks)).
169  See Jenkins, 2008 WL 410237, at *2 (stating that Jenkins would have trouble reading street 
signs quickly, read aloud in church, or watch movies with subtitles).
170  See Jenkins, 2009 WL 331638, at *1 (quoting the district court’s decision in Jenkins, 2008 WL 
410237, at *2). 
171  See id. at *4 (remanding the case for redetermination in accordance with the ADAAA).
172  Id. at *1.
173  See id. (noting that Jenkins was not looking for relief for past discrimination, but extra time 
on a test administered after the ADAAA became effective). 
174  See id. (distinguishing the case from those that seek damages for past discrimination under 
the ADAAA). 
175  See id. at *2-3 (“The change in the law has therefore undermined the district court’s holding . 
. . .”). 
176  See id. at *4 (remanding the case for further findings, rather than a directed verdict). 
 Legislation & Policy Brief 27
do to accommodate an individual with a reading impairment.177
There has been no actual case law applying the ADAAA to cases 
seeking damages, the type of cases that makes up a significant major-
ity of ADA cases. Therefore, it is only possible to anticipate, based on 
the language of the statute, the legislative history of the amendments, 
and the new EEOC Final Regulations, how individuals with disabili-
ties, and particularly individuals with mental illnesses will fare under 
the ADAAA.
The most significant change for all individuals with disabilities, but 
specifically for individuals with mental illnesses, under the ADAAA, is 
that courts are now instructed to put more focus on the discrimination 
that the person has possibly been subjected to rather than the determi-
nation of whether or not the person is disabled under the law.178 This 
is a momentous change from the ADA, where a considerable number 
of cases were decided on summary judgment for the employer because 
the plaintiff could not adequately prove he or she was qualified as a 
disabled individual under the law.179
The EEOC, in its Final Regulations, acknowledges that the new ver-
sion of the law should help people with a number of ailments, and 
among those listed are people with mental illnesses.180 This is in part 
because, in terms of reasonable accommodations for mental illnesses, 
the costs are generally low to non-existent, with many employees sim-
ply asking for schedule changes, slight modifications to their job func-
tions, or minimal time off for treatment.181 Additionally, with the inclu-
sion of “interacting with others” to the EEOC’s list of activities that, if 
affected by a disability, constitute a major life activity, many people 
with mental illnesses of all types will be more likely to qualify as dis-
abled under the ADAAA. This is because with many mental illnesses, 
the individuals, for various reasons, have trouble interacting with oth-
ers, something that most people take for granted in their daily lives. 
However, it is something that, under the old law, a court could easily 
have determined was not “significant” or “severe” enough to consti-
tute coverage for the individual under the law. The EEOC also points 
out that while there should not be per se disabilities, there are some 
that should predictably win out on the question of whether or not the 
177  See id. at *4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12189).
178  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
179  See generally Evans v. Consumer Info. Dispute Resolution, 223 F. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Johnson v. Maynard, 2003 WL 548754, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2003) (holding that just having 
a disorder such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia is not enough to qualify as an individual 
with a disability); Schwartz v. Comex, 1997 WL 187353, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997) (finding 
that a paranoid thought disorder, on its own, is not enough to qualify as an individual with a 
disability).
180  76 FR 16987 (March 25, 2011). 
181  Id.
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person with such illness or condition is actually disabled.182 The Com-
mission points out that no disability can truly be per se since the law 
still shows a desire for an individualized assessment, albeit a modified, 
briefer assessment than existed in the past.183 The EEOC also enumer-
ates a number of disorders, specifically listing why, on an almost per se 
basis, they should be considered to limit major bodily functions, a cat-
egory that was added to supplement the major life activities column.184 
The list provided by the EEOC mentions that “major depressive disor-
der, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compul
sive disorder, and schizophrenia substantially limit brain function.”185 
By providing this list, the EEOC is attempting to ensure that individu-
als with a broad range of mental illnesses will have a greater chance of 
full coverage under the ADAAA given that Congress decided not to 
include interacting with others in its list of major life activities in the 
new law. 
Although Congress did not list interacting with others as a major 
life activity in the final bill, the House of Representatives did acknowl-
edge it as a possibility.186 The Education and Labor Committee, in its 
Report, mentions in its explanation of major life activities that, among 
other activities, “interacting with others” should be considered a major 
life activity under the ADAAA.187 To illustrate its beliefs, the Commit-
tee discussed Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a case in which an indi-
vidual with an intellectual disability tried to bring suit under the ADA 
on the premise that his disability substantially limited him in the major 
life activities of learning, thinking, communicating, social interaction, 
and working.188 The Court expressed doubt about whether thinking, 
communication, and social interactions could be considered major life 
activities. 189 The Court ultimately determined it was irrelevant whether 
those were major life activities because Littleton had not proven that he 
was substantially limited in any of those activities.190 In the Education 
and Labor Committee’s Report, the Committee mentions that under 
the new law, Littleton should be able to “provide evidence of material 
restriction in the major life activities of thinking, learning, communi-
cating and interacting with others.”191 This acknowledges the possibil-
182  Id. § 1630.2(j)(3).
183  Id.
184  Id.
185  Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).
186  H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 11 (2008) (Report of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor) [hereafter 
Educ. & Labor Rep.] (explaining that the statutory list is not finite and an example of a major life 
activity include interacting with others).
187  Id.
188  Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 231 F.App’x 874, 875 (11th Cir. 2007). 
189  Id. at 877.
190  Id. at 877-78.
191  Educ. & Labor Rep., supra note 186, at 10. 
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ity of adding interacting with others to the list of major life activities, 
but it was not ultimately added into the final version. 
A huge victory for individuals with mental illnesses was the over-
turning of the decision in Sutton.192 As was explained above, under the 
rule requiring courts to view an individual with a disability in his or 
her mitigated state when determining whether he or she qualifies as 
disabled under the legislation,193 many individuals with mental illness-
es were no longer qualified under the ADA. This was due in part to the 
therapies (medication, cognitive, behavioral, etc.) that the individual 
used to mitigate his or her illness, leading the condition to be consid-
ered controlled, and therefore not substantially limiting any major life 
activities. As a result, many people who legitimately should have been 
covered by the ADA, and who Congress appears to have wanted cov-
ered under the ADA, were wrongfully denied coverage. Along with 
Sutton being overturned, Congress specified that if a disability is “epi-
sodic or in remission[, it] is a disability if it would substantially limit a 
major life activity when active.”194
With the removal of the Sutton precedent, and the addition of the 
episodic provision, individuals with mental illnesses should have a 
much easier time proving their disabilities. Some argue that removing 
the Sutton precedent will allow individuals with minor impairments 
that are fully mitigated by simple measures to have access to coverage 
under the law when such individuals are not the actual intended re-
cipients of the law’s reach.195 However, it appears as though Congress 
is not intending for people to be excluded from coverage just because 
some would consider their conditions minor.196 If the individual has a 
condition that does in fact limit, in some way, a major life activity or a 
major bodily function, Congress is intending the individual to be eli-
gible for coverage under the law.197
The vast majority of individuals with mental illnesses use some 
type of mitigating measure for such illnesses, as they often would 
not be able to adequately function, and therefore would likely not be 
qualified for the jobs they are seeking or were discriminated against 
in, if they did not. Under the old regime, they faced the very realis-
tic possibility that their attempts to normalize their lives and control 
their illnesses would lead to them not being covered under a piece of 
legislation that was intended to protect them.198 However, under the 
192  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
193  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 472 (1999).
194  Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a)(4)(D), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
195  See Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 331, 361-
62 (2010) (arguing that the ADAAA requires a court to consider an individual’s impairment in a 
hypothetical condition).
196  Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
197  Id.
198  See Ravencraft, supra note 155, at 442-45.
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new regime, these individuals should be covered.199 Theoretically, the 
courts should view the individual as he or she is without mitigation of 
his or her mental illness.200 For many with a mental illness, as the EEOC 
points out in its Final Regulations, without the consideration of medi-
cations and other mitigating measures, his or her illness is a disability 
and he or she should be afforded coverage under the law.201 
In addition, with the episodic and remission provision added, indi-
viduals with mental illnesses will have an even greater chance of get-
ting the coverage under the ADAAA that Congress intended them to 
have. Many, although certainly not all, mental illnesses, even if untreat-
ed, are somewhat episodic. Additionally, many of those same mental 
illnesses can be considered to be essentially in remission with the use of 
medications and the appropriate forms of therapy. However, even if a 
person is not currently experiencing symptoms of his or her mental ill-
ness, the individual is still suffering from the disease because there are 
no cures for mental illnesses. With the changes in the ADAAA, Con-
gress is making it clear that it intends for these types of individuals to 
be given full coverage under the law.
Individuals with mental illnesses are often the target of discrimina-
tion based not on their actual disabilities, but as a result of myths, fears 
and stereotypes. Because of this false belief, individuals with real dis-
abilities that are not actually very disabling could easily be “regarded 
as” disabled, the third prong of the disability definition.202 It is unfor-
tunate that there are a number of people, including many employers, 
who have certain beliefs about what it means to have a mental illness. 
There are an unfortunate number of people who, for whatever reason, 
will reveal to an employer that they have a mental illness, and will then 
be treated differently because of it. When the individual is discrimi-
nated against because of an actual mental illness, the discussion above 
applies. 
The change relating to the “regarded as” clause of the disability 
definition has to do with reasonable accommodations.203 Under the 
ADAAA, if a person is regarded as having a disability and is discrim-
inated against, the person, under the new law, is not entitled to re-
quest a reasonable accommodation from his or her employer.204 In a 
sense, this is the protection the law provides for employers given that 
if they believe someone has a disability, and they regard the individual 
199  But see Reagan S. Bissonnette, Note, Reasonably Accommodating Nonmitigating Plaintiffs after 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 859, 862 (2009) (arguing that it is likely that non-
mitigating plaintiffs will have trouble making a case under the ADAAA because they will likely 
be considered not otherwise qualified).
200  See Ravencraft, supra note 155, at 445-46.
201  Id. at 447.
202  Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3(1)(C), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
203  Id. § 6(h).
204  Id.
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as such, and subsequently discriminate against him or her based on 
their mistaken beliefs, under this law they are not responsible for ac-
commodating the individual for a disease or disorder that the person 
does not actually have. Additionally, if a person has a disability, but the 
employer regards them as being in a worse state due to the disability 
than he or she actually is, the person still has the “actual disability” or 
“record of disability” prongs to fall back on.205 
This is especially important given the new version of the legisla-
tion. Previously, if a person was regarded as having a disability that 
was worse than it actually was, especially if it was less severe due to 
mitigation, he or she often encountered difficulties trying to prevail in 
court. Now, however, if a person has a mental illness that is being miti-
gated so it is not as severe as his or her employer seems to believe it is, 
the mitigating measures that lessen the severity of the disability can-
not be taken into account.206 Given the new law, individuals that most 
likely could not prevail in the past will have a much greater chance of 
prevailing today.
One aspect of the ADA that did not significantly change with the 
creation of the ADAAA is the overall requirement of reasonable accom-
modations. Under the law set forth in the ADA, an employer is gener-
ally required to accommodate an employee with a disability as long as 
that person can be considered otherwise qualified to do the job.207 Un-
der the ADA, and now under the ADAAA, the employer did not have 
to accommodate the individual with a disability if the accommodation 
would cause an undue hardship for the employer.208 Under the stat-
ute, an undue hardship is “an action requiring significant difficulty or 
expense.”209 Whether an accommodation would be an undue hardship 
for the employer is determined by examining the nature and cost of 
the overall accommodation, the overall financial resources of the facil-
ity or covered entity, and the type of operation of the covered entity.210 
Reasonable accommodations are generally among the least expensive 
accommodations for individuals with mental illnesses, with employees 
most commonly asking for things like schedule modifications, the abil-
ity to work from home, or slight modifications to non-essential func-
tions of the job.211
205  Id. § 3(1).
206  Id. § 2(b)(3).
207  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (making it discriminatory action to not make “reasonable ac-
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Conclusion
No one knows exactly what will transpire under the ADAAA. In 
2008, when Congress passed sweeping amendments to the ground-
breaking law from 1990, its intention was to undo decisions by the 
Supreme Court that severely narrowed the scope of the ADA. In its 
attempt to right the Supreme Court’s wrongs, Congress spelled out its 
goal of effectively overturning the decisions in the “Sutton Trilogy” and 
Toyota. In addition, and with the assistance of the EEOC Final Regula-
tions, new rules are laid out for the courts to follow in the future litiga-
tion that unfortunately is bound to come.
Under the old law, individuals with mental illnesses were incred-
ibly unsuccessful in challenging the unlawful actions of their employ-
ers when employers discriminated against them on the basis of dis-
ability. In most cases, the failure of the employees was not because the 
discriminatory actions did not actually happen or could not be proven. 
In most cases the litigation never reached the stage of determining fault 
on the discrimination claim because, due to the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the ADA’s definition of disability, including substantially 
limiting and major life activities, most cases were decided on summary 
judgment for the employer. This was because the plaintiff, the employ-
ee with a mental illness, was not able to adequately prove to the court 
that he or she was actually disabled under the law.
Under the new legislation, plaintiffs with disabilities, and especially 
those with mental illnesses should be much more successful, although 
no one can guarantee what the courts will ultimately do with the new 
law. The ADAAA specifically overturns previous Supreme Court prece-
dent that was particularly detrimental to plaintiffs with mental illnesses. 
This includes the rule requiring plaintiffs to be viewed in their mitigated 
state, and the making stricter of the definition of “substantially limits.”
In addition to overturning bad decisions by the Supreme Court, 
Congress, with the assistance of the EEOC Regulations, specifically in-
structs the courts that the main determination needs to be whether the 
employee was discriminated against, not whether the employee is or 
is not disabled. Additionally, the new law and regulations make clear 
that mental illnesses should be considered disabilities, either in that 
they do substantially limit a range of major life activities, including 
thinking and interacting with others, or in that they affect major bodily 
functions of the brain or other neurological functions.
Under the ADAAA, we should see plaintiffs with mental illnesses 
become more successful in their attempts to bring discrimination claims 
against their employers on the basis of disability. Of course, given 
that in 2009, not a single plaintiff with mental illness was successful 
in their employment discrimination claim, it is not a high standard to 
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overcome. Ultimately, the new law should work to help these plain-
tiffs, who greatly need the protection, to be successful, and hopefully 
will lead to a decrease in this discrimination happening.
